Steven Levine's chapter ("Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy") notes the role of history and how it affects China's relations with other countries:
“Chinese leaders tend to internalize a sense of historical resentment at the raw deal which history has given them. This resentment often translates into a claim of entitlement upon others. When other states behave toward China in accordance with their supposed obligations, everything is fine. But when these claims are not recognized, or are recognized only partially, additional layers of Chinese resentment may build up. This hypersensitivity is manifested with respect to symbolic and status issues no less than to substantive issues of resource allocations and power.” [p. 44]
David Shambaugh, in "Patterns of Interactions in Sino-American Relations" also points to the historical dimension, and how it has contributed to a pattern of cooperation and tension that will continue into the future:
“It is a relationship fraught with high emotions, misperceptions, and considerable historical baggage.” [p. 223]
But something is missing. The writers cite geopolitical, economic, social, historical, and ideological variables to explain the development of China's foreign relations, but there is only limited mention of the role of foreign media (primarily concerning the Tiananmen coverage) and no mention of the role of the Chinese media in impacting China's foreign relations.
This is really surprising to me. How can experts on foreign policy overlook the role of mass media in influencing Chinese foreign policy? They mention "historical baggage," but Chinese people -- and policy makers -- develop their perceptions of history not just from grandpa's stories of the concessions and elementary school textbooks, but also from a relentless diet of state-sanctioned history and one-sided international worldviews disseminated by Xinhua and other state-run media outlets since 1949.
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