In Journalism Studies Volume 4, Number 2, pages 225-238 (May 2003), I read with some interest an article by Hugo De Burgh of Goldsmith's College, London, called "Great Aspirations and Conventional Repertoires: Chinese regional television journalists and their work." According to the abstract,
This paper examines Chinese regional television news packages to establish what congruence there might be between the declared beliefs of the reporters about their work, and the reports they produce each day. Chinese television reporters from Hangzhou were interviewed and their news product examined across a month long sample. Interviews conducted with Chinese journalists revealed that they see themselves as scrutinising government, representing the people to the government and vice versa. Examination of their news product, however, suggests that they are mere transmitters of the political line of the government and of the cultural prejudices of their masters.
De Burgh makes some interesting contrasts between television news coverage in Hangzhou and Birmingham, England. There is no doubt that this is a critical study -- a condemnation, even -- of Chinese journalism practices. De Burgh is a former British television newsman who did his PhD on Chinese regional television journalists, which included 11 weeks of field study in China in 2000 or 2001. Besides pointing readers toward some relevant studies of Chinese journalism, he also concisely sums up "themes" in Chinese journalism which serve as a helpful summary for the state of Chinese journalism today:
Governing Themes or Myths (signification)
The myth of hierarchy and leadership. Scholars of
Chinese social psychology (Bond, 1999), of
management (Redding, 1990), of bureaucracy
(Weber, in Beetham, 1974) and of family life
(Ho, 1989) have argued that Chinese people are
more inclined than Anglophones to accept
hierarchy as natural, to expect paternalism and
to attribute competence to leaders. It should
therefore not be surprising that journalism
devotes a very large amount of its time to the
doings and pronouncements of these leaders.
The myth of the CCP as saviour.
Friedman (1995) and other scholars have characterised the CCP
story of how it saved China from both foreign
imperialism and internal traitors, and how it
remains the only possible salvation for all
Chinese people everywhere, as the "northern
narrative". They critique it as only one of the
possible ways of interpreting modern Chinese
history and of predicting China's future. Thus
they have placed the narrative in a wider
cultural perspective, diminishing claims made
for its authority. It is not surprising that this
particular myth is prominent, since it cannot be
publicly challenged in China.
The myths of cooperation, unanimity and absence of
conflict.
The same scholars who have described
the propensity to hierarchy in Chinese society
have also pointed to the belief that unanimity is
possible, desirable and to be presented as if
true. This is a society that values interpersonal
and inter-unit harmony and does not value
open confrontation. Thus we can say that the
importance given to the coverage of
meetings--which are not televisual--and
except that the emphasis seems slightly
different. We do not see the solutions in
England, but we are usually promised them, so
that we can relax. While this is also the case in
Chinese stories, there appears to be a greater
propensity to transmit stories only once the
solutions have been worked out and are in
operation.
The myth of salvation through wealth.
It appears to be an unspoken belief underpinning the vast
amount of programming covering different
aspects of economic development--and on the
whole in a dull way, supplying statistics over
mediocre footage, without any attempt at
human interest--that economic development is
the most important thing in the world. Since
the content of many of the other stories, of
meetings and high leader activity for example,
is also connected to economic development, we
can see that this myth suffuses most of the
news. That it is an important myth in todayХs
China will not be a surprise. This is also an
important myth in England, but English news
is not pervaded by it. One possible reason for
this relative exclusion is that it is eclipsed by a
stronger myth, that of the individual, which has
every issue and every event presented in
individual human-interest terms, diluting other
messages.
Later, De Burgh observes:
Chinese regional television news rarely challenges
or investigates; in the interviews, the
reporters appear to believe that they are doing
just, but in practice they beat the drum for
economic progress, passing on the statistics
provided by government departments and
large companies, and promote the image of the
leadership and the myth of the CCP as the
essential dynamo of China. Indeed the range of
news content is not substantially different from
that identified by other researchers twenty
years previously, notably by Porter in his report
of NCNA news selection and operation
(Porter, 1992, Appendices A and B).
Ah-hah! So someone else has studied New China News Agency (i.e., Xinhua) news content in depth, and reported the findings in English. I must check this research, it pertains directly to what I am interested in. According to bibliography, the paper, or book, is
Porter, Robin (Ed.) (1992) Reporting the News from China, London: RIIA.
I've requested it from the Harvard depository, and maybe will pick it up next week when I go to Cambridge for the ALM thesis-writers' meeting.
Lastly, an interesting footnote appeared in De Burgh's paper, regarding the role of directives from propaganda departments on television journalists in Hangzhou:
Editors regularly receive directives from party offices, originating from the CCP Central Propaganda Department, the New China News Agency (NCNA) and the Propaganda Department of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) General Political Department. One of these offices’ principal jobs is to supply the appropriate formulations in regular circulars or in the newsletters for journalists, such as Newspaper Trends. There are weekly post facto evaluation sessions held at most media outlets, at which party officials are present. The word “propaganda” has recently been changed to “information” in English translations of the titles referred to above.
This footnote confirms what others have suggested regarding the influence of the government upon journalism coverage in China. While some coverage may be considered "self censorship" to appease the official line, this account suggests that direct government influence upon news reporting is alive and well in China.
Also, as I was perusing the articles, I considered a potential weakness in doing a content analysis of Xinhua content based on frequency counts of words related to Chinese history. An early idea of mine was that an increase in such references would indicate an increase in the government to promote nationalism, but there are alternate hypotheses .... would this increase represent more propaganda, or legitimate commemorations or celebrations of Chinese heritage? For instance, an increase over time of refs to "Zheng He" could be citing Zheng He's accomplishments in order to build national pride, or to give props to the contributions of Chinese muslims in order to build a sense of belonging or unity among minorities. But, when one considers Communism has on the wane since the mid 1970s, and the anti-feudal attitudes of the 1960s and 1970s are fading, these references could indicate that people want to rediscover and celebrate Chinese history.
On the other hand, a good case for nationalistic or patriotic feeling and history could be made if one ties in refs to historical incidents or persons to references to the government, the party, or other touchstones of nationalism.
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