Monday, October 31, 2005

China's "Titan Rain" hacker attacks on the U.S.

Interesting column by Ira Winkler, on the Computerworld website. Ira is a security expert and former NSA (National Security Agency) employee who writes and lectures on computer security. He's a great speaker, and a very talented writer, but in this column I don't agree with everything he says.

Ira brings up the old story about massive, skilled hacker attacks on U.S. government and corporate systems originating in China. But he says it's not just because systems there are so poorly secured, and hackers elsewhere use Chinese servers as a staging point.

Winkler says there is an orchestrated effort, known in computer security circles as "Titan Rain," to extract from U.S. computer systems any valuable information, for apparently sinister purposes. He cites the work of Shawn Carpenter, a security analyst at Sandia National Laboratories, to identify the source of the attacks:
Using computer forensics techniques and hacking into the offending systems, Carpenter was able to use the compromised systems against themselves and find the actual origin of the attacks. Doing things that official government agents could not, he determined that the root of the attacks was China. He set up the attack systems to report back to him what the attackers were doing and also performed analysis of the attacks. Based on the volume of the attacks, he determined that there were anywhere from six to 10 people hacking around the clock.

Given the skill and the size of the operation, there could be only two sources of the attack: the Chinese intelligence agencies or the Chinese triads (a.k.a., the Chinese Mafia). As I describe in my book, Spies Among Us (Wiley, 2005), China as a government vacuums up whatever information it can for potential value. Chinese triads examine whatever they can get for profit potential, whether it's to extort money or to sell to the highest bidder. Even worse for non-Chinese entities, the Chinese government cooperates and exchanges information with the triads.
This is an interesting story, but I am a bit skeptical about the claim about "triads." It's part of the trend of Western journalists and authors talking about Chinese organized crime members in awed tones, as if they are these efficient, mysterious, ruthless criminal masterminds capable of doing practically anything to achieve their nefarious aims. While I recognize the power of some of these organizations and secret societies to corrupt Chinese political life (the Nationalists have an especially weak reputation in this regard, starting with the Green Gang/Jiang Jieshi connection and continuing to the present day in Taiwan) and make lots of money through both illegal and legal channels, the idea that some are conducting sweeping computerized espionage against U.S. government and commercial entities is doubtful, in my opinion, for the following three reasons:

1) It doesn't fit their M.O. in terms of traditional criminal rackets

2) It spreads too wide a net rather than going after specific attractive or lucrative targets

3) It targets the U.S. government, which invites investigation, extradition, prosecution, and other forms of retaliation in a foreign environment where guanxi won't get them off the hook.

On the other hand, the idea that the Chinese government is conducting high-level computerized espionage seems very likely. Isn't that what we do to them, too, via various NSA and DoD initiatives?

Iraq's prestory: Historical records on Tonkin, suppressed

More evidence that historians work is relevant to modern society -- A New York Times article reports on the four-year-old conclusions that an NSA historian made, after examining the U.S. government's handling of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident ("Doubts Cast on Vietnam Incident, but Secret Study Stays Classified", Scott Shane, Oct. 21, 2005):
... The N.S.A. historian, Robert J. Hanyok, found a pattern of translation mistakes that went uncorrected, altered intercept times and selective citation of intelligence that persuaded him that midlevel agency officers had deliberately skewed the evidence.

Mr. Hanyok concluded that they had done it not out of any political motive but to cover up earlier errors, and that top N.S.A. and defense officials and Johnson neither knew about nor condoned the deception.

Mr. Hanyok's findings were published nearly five years ago in a classified in-house journal, and starting in 2002 he and other government historians argued that it should be made public. But their effort was rebuffed by higher-level agency policymakers, who by the next year were fearful that it might prompt uncomfortable comparisons with the flawed intelligence used to justify the war in Iraq, according to an intelligence official familiar with some internal discussions of the matter.
What if the government had not lied or exaggerated Tonkin? What if this historian's report had been released in 2001, as our current government made a case for invading Iraq? This is not merely a counterfactual exercise -- people live and die by coverups and faulty reports!

Sunday, October 30, 2005

HESA website and budget

In case you missed the announcement, the Harvard Extension Students Association has redesigned its website. You can see it here.

A couple of interesting, new links which I found on the HESA site while poking around include Vision, "An interdisciplinary journal, [which] endeavors to catalyze a broad discussion of the most pressing policy issues to be addressed in the coming decades." Harvard Extension Students help edit this publication.

I also found HESA budget documents. Yes, the organization gets funding from the Extension School, but expenses seem to be reasonable.

Friday, October 28, 2005

Building Chinese Harvards

The reverse brain-drain of Chinese science, business, and technical talent was identified in the mid 1990s, when China's economy began to pick up steam, and opportunities arose for native sons and daughters to return to China to work or start businesses.

There has been a similar trend taking place in Chinese universities, writes Howard French of the New York Times. Chinese universities want to become world class, and are making attractive offers to foreign-trained, Chinese-speaking scholars to come to China to teach and conduct research.

Chinese universities are very confident they are on the right track:
"Maybe in 20 years M.I.T. will be studying Qinghua's example," says Rao Zihe, director of the Institute of Biophysics at Qinghua University, an institution renowned for its sciences and regarded by many as China's finest university. "How long it will take to catch up can't be predicted, but in some respects we are already better than the Harvards today."
But there is a fly in the ointment, when it comes to the social sciences:
China is focusing on science and technology, areas that reflect the country's development needs but also reflect the preferences of an authoritarian system that restricts speech. The liberal arts often involve critical thinking about politics, economics and history, and China's government, which strictly limits public debate, has placed relatively little emphasis on achieving international status in those subjects.

In fact, Chinese say - most often euphemistically and indirectly - that those very restrictions on academic debate could hamper efforts to create world-class universities.

"Right now, I don't think any university in China has an atmosphere comparable to the older Western universities - Harvard or Oxford - in terms of freedom of expression," said Lin Jianhua, Beijing University's executive vice president. "We are trying to give the students a better environment, but in order to do these things we need time. Not 10 years, but maybe one or two generations."
Interesting to see how these issues and trends pan out in the future.

Thursday, October 27, 2005

Stanford's podcast lectures

This is interesting. Stanford has a program to produce audio versions of lectures that can be downloaded into portable mp3 players, such as the Apple iPod (the term for audio files used in this manner is "podcast").

This is not a new idea. If you've attended Harvard Extension School, especially some of the larger lectures, you've probably noticed a lot of people putting portable tape players and digital audio recorders on the table to record them for playback later. I've even noticed people with iPods attaching microphones to their mp3 players, so they don't even need to download the audio file -- it's already on their player, ready to be listened to.

I welcome this trend, especially if I can download audio content from respected professors in my field of study who don't teach in the Boston area. I've owned an iPod for more than a year, and sometimes hook it up to my car stereo to listen to music -- why not educational lectures by world-class professors instead?

Other posts about educational podcasting:

Where have all the podcasts gone? (Discusses UC Berkeley podcasts, Harvard podcasts, and Apple's iTunes I program)

Educational podcasting: Why isn't Harvard doing more?

Wednesday, October 26, 2005

History on the small screen: Rome

I've written about the role of movies in promoting interest in history, specifically "The Last Samurai" and its portrayal of Meiji Japan.

I've also written how nonfiction television programs can promote interest in history. PBS and History Channel programs and documentaries on American and world history have proved to be excellent educational tools.

But certain fictional television dramas with a historical bent also deserve recognition. I watched two episodes of Rome last night on HBO. Yes, it's a soap opera, based on interactions and disputes between various characters, that is set in ancient Rome. But in addition to the dramatic plot elements, the producers have taken care to highlight important issues in Roman society -- slavery, the Roman military system, and citizens' devotion to Greco/Roman religion.

If some of the scenes dealing with slavery, torture, and sex weren't so graphic, I would recommend this to teachers of Latin and world history at the high-school level. Of course, college students can still watch this, as well as any adult who is interested in Roman history and society.

Thursday, October 20, 2005

Travel and time management

It's been awhile since I last posted, but I have a good excuse: I was out of the country.

I have to say that on this trip, I didn't make good use of my travel time to get reading and note-taking out of the way. I usually overpack books and study materials when I am flying, but this time I underpacked, only bringing one textbook on international relations and two issues of Foreign Policy magazine. I blew threw the magazines (and several newspapers) on the first five hour leg, and the textbook on the second jump of four hours (including airport waiting time). That left nine hours on the return trip with nothing to read except newspapers, not to mention three hours of intermediary train travel where the only thing to look at was scenery outside the window which I had seen many times before.

Moral of the story: When you are working on research and have to travel, bring twice as much reading material as you think you'll need. When you are trapped in economy class airplane seats, books and journal articles are great -- they don't require a plug or Internet connectivity, and they might even help you get to sleep.

Wednesday, October 12, 2005

Facebook gets phished

Facebook's popularity now makes it a target for phishers, the Internet criminals who send fake emails in an effort to glom people's personal information and passwords. Usually the purpose is to crack into online trading accounts, or set up credit cards in someone else's name, but for some reason Facebook info is popular. This is the email I received this morning from Facebook:
We have received many reports of virus and spam emails disguised as
"crush" messages or requests for people's Facebook email and password. If
you click on the links in these spam emails, your computer could become
infected or you and your friends could become the target of spam
messages.

Obviously this sucks, so remember these two things:

1. If you see any sketchy emails, don't click on any of the links. If
you do, you might get a virus or get more spam.

2. Facebook will never ask you to give your email and password (except
for logging in), to reconfirm your account or to do anything to keep
your account.

We take your privacy and security very seriously. We first found out
about these virus and spam emails from our members, and we hope that
together we can continue to make Facebook a sweet place.

For those readers who have no idea what Facebook is, it's a "social networking site for college and university students, and increasingly, their young alumni. Register to see how it works. There are a handful of Extension School students, and one prospective student contacted me through the service.

Tuesday, October 11, 2005

Proposal update, 10/11/05

Another update on my thesis proposal. I've spent the weekend refining and simplifying my research problem, hypothesis, and methodology. It's so easy to start introducing background information, or get sidetracked on other issues, or expand the study, and on the ninth I once again forced myself to scale down the "Research Problem" section of my proposal. It has taken me four nights to whittle it down to a size and scope I am comfortable with.

The Extension School's ALM research advisor has said he can review this section of my proposal, prior to me sending in the entire document. I will recheck what I have written tonight, and then send it along to him to see what he has to say tomorrow night.

Sunday, October 09, 2005

Xinhua: The Internet promotes democracy in China

Xinhua (New China News Agency) has published a report (link via China Daily) on the state of the Internet in China. It has a lot of the news we've seen before on this topic -- 100 million plus Internet users, rise of blogging, businesses piling in, etc. -- and predictably gives credit to the government for rapid growth across the country.

Unpredictably, the NCNA report included the following, discussing the Internet's role in promoting democracy in China with CSPAN-like broadcasts and public opinion polls:
On July 25, a live online broadcast in East China's Zhejiang Province attracted the attention of 100,000-plus netizens, which allowed them for the first time to watch online a session of the standing committee of the provincial people's congress, the local legislature, which is traditionally met behind closed doors.

"By watching live online broadcasting, Chinese citizens are endowed with a chance to participate in the democracy-building process," comments Xia Xueluan, a professor of sociology with Beijing University.

In fact, Zhejiang is not alone to apply the Internet to politics. The Beijing municipal government already launched an online opinion poll in 2003. Logging into www.beijing.gov.cn, local netizens can cast votes on 64 governmental organs under the municipality. In two years' time, more than 140,000 netizens have aired their views on the administrations' effectiveness, transparency and legal awareness. And their votes on issues ranging from whether the city should lift the ban on firecrackers to the area of buffer zone of the Forbidden City as a World Heritage Site has been taken into consideration in policy making.

Friday, October 07, 2005

Tweaking research question and hypotheses

I've been stuck over the past few days at the point in my thesis proposal where I lay out the questions/problems and propose my hypotheses. The problems I identified and phrased as questions seemed weak -- more descriptive than investigative: "In Beijing's view, these four geopolitical, regional, and bilateral factors affected Sino-Viet relations: Soviet influence on Vietnam, the Kampuchean conflict, the ethnic Chinese question, and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Which was more important, and what were the connections between these factors?" This, of couse, had a knock-on effect on my hypotheses, which seemed to merely verify that the problems existed, rather than providing a resolution to a genuine question: "Certain factors were more important at certain times. There were correlations between some factors, but not all."

So I've been considering how I might change the problems/questions. This morning in the car I came up with a new approach. The problem: Research on Chinese foreign relations indicates the People's Republic of China consistently struggled to maintain a foreign policy independent of superpower interests after the death of Mao Zedong until the breakup of the Soviet Union. However, did Beijing view superpower interests in Vietnam or regional and bilateral issues as being more important in guiding Sino-Viet relations? My hypotheses: A computer-assisted content analysis of New China News Agency (NCNA) English wire service articles will show that in Beijing's view, regional and bilateral issues were far more important than Soviet or U.S. influence in Vietnam.

I'll try to work these into the draft proposal this weekend.

Thursday, October 06, 2005

Vietnam and Iraq: promoting democracy, and forgetting about it

Do people learn from the mistakes of the past? One would hope so.

When it comes to Iraq, however, we clearly have not. Hundreds of thousands of our soldiers -- men and women like us with families, lives, hopes and fears -- have been sent there by a president and his political allies to fight a mission based on lies. A mission based on lies is, by definition, a flawed mission, no matter how dedicated our soldiers are or noble our ambitions. Many observers have made an analogy with Vietnam, in terms of the military being "bogged down." It's a cliche, but it's true. Let's not dance around the definition. We are currently bogged down in Iraq.

The political similarities between Vietnam and Iraq should also be considered. In the 1960s, our leaders constantly talked about the struggle to promote democracy and all of the good work we were doing fixing roads and building schools. Sound familiar?

Nowadays, few people in Vietnam care about the elections we helped oversee, or the schools we helped build. The older people remember the deaths, the bombs, the hatred. There are lots of younger Vietnamese who respect and appreciate America now, but it's not because of our actions of 30 or 40 years ago. Instead, it's the trappings of modern society imported from outside, the possibility of making a decent living thanks to the interconnected global economy, and the distant promise eventually having more control over their destinies than is possible in an authoritarian country.

I am not the only one to be making comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam. I saw this letter, signed by Eugene Burkhart, in the Daily News Tribune newspaper (my local paper), part of which I am excerpting below:
It is proper and just that we remember and honor those who died in the Vietnam War. Each name on the wall represents a unique and precious story of loss and sacrifice. But all those stories are also part of a larger story, the great national tragedy that was the Vietnam War. We do a disservice to those most affected by that war if we are unmindful or untruthful about it. We should not forget the fallen soldiers nor should we forget the war they died in. Let us then remember that war -- no matter how hard and painful that might be.

Let us remember how the government lied about the Gulf of Tonkin incident at the start of the war, and would lie again and again.

Let us remember Vietnam, a small country of rice paddies and villages on which more tonnage of bombs was dropped than in all of World War II.

Let us remember how George W. Bush and most middle-class youth were able to avoid the war; and how the fighting and dying fell on a disproportionate number of Afro-Americans and those from low-income families.

Let us remember that those politicians and Americans (the so-called silent majority) who most supported the war largely forgot the veterans when the war was over.

Let us remember the over 58,000 Americans and over 1 million Vietnamese who died in that war.

And finally, when we remember that this war did not make us any safer, did not protect our liberties, did not defend us from an aggressor nation or from any real threat to our national security, and that we as a nation seemingly have learned nothing from it, then let us bow our heads in sorrow and shame, and pray that God may forgive America.
The rest of the letter is here.

Wednesday, October 05, 2005

Thesis proposal: Keep it simple

James Gosling at Sun has written about his experience preparing for his thesis topic:
Back when I was a grad student I was spinning out of control trying to come up with a thesis topic. My advisor took me out to lunch one day and asked me a simple question: "What is a PhD thesis?" I yattered on for a while and he listened patiently. Eventually he said "No: It's just a stack of 100 pages with 4 signatures on top". I was falling into a common grad student trap of feeling that I needed to do something grandiose and solve all of the worlds problems. He was into "keep it simple". So I did, and I came up with a pretty straightforward thesis proposal. The odd thing was that when I finally finished my thesis, I realized that I had only dealt with one sentence out of the simplified proposal.
Well, I don't know if I will cover just one of my proposed research questions (I now have three), but I have to agree with his strategy of keeping it simple. I have already begun to pare down my ambitions, by reducing the time period under study, eliminating variables from consideration, and simplifying my methodology.

I am also realistic about what will become of my research. I am a pessimist by nature. I know my thesis will not solve the world's problems. I will be thankful if it really contributes to the academic discourse about China, but I honestly expect it will be read or cited by a just a handful of people, and gather dust in the Grossman Library.

Tuesday, October 04, 2005

Part-time vs. Full-time, Online, and my Harvard whine

Ronald Alsop of the Wall Street Journal wrote a very interesting story in the Sept. 21 issue, entitled "The Full-Time Advantage: Students increasingly are pursuing part-time, online and executive M.B.A.s; But recruiters have their doubts."

The explosion of alternative degree programs is old news, but in the M.B.A. world, there is stigma attached to students who attend them, at least in the eyes of recruiters:
M.B.A. Lite -- that's what many corporate recruiters call the various alternatives to a full-time program. In The Wall Street Journal/Harris Interactive survey, recruiters viewed all three of the major alternative approaches, particularly online programs, as inferior to full-time degrees. About 30% of recruiters said they don't believe executive programs build students' skills nearly as well as full-time programs, while slightly more -- 34% -- found part-time programs much less effective. ... In most corporate recruiters' hierarchy, the full-time degree would be on top, followed by the executive M.B.A., then the part-time program, and on the bottom, the online option.

Executive and part-time M.B.A.s at least get a little respect. Online M.B.A.s, however, are viewed with extreme scepticism:
About 80% of recruiters said these programs aren't as effective in developing skills as a full-time M.B.A. In fact, nearly 40% of recruiters rated them as "not at all effective." ... In the Journal survey, recruiters reserved their most savage comments for increasingly popular online M.B.A. degrees. "Come on," one respondent said. "Anyone in the world can do an online M.B.A. It's a commodity." Another said he had been asked to teach courses in online programs for which he felt unqualified, leading him to conclude that they are "scams."

Before you start jumping to conclusions of what these statements mean for the Harvard Extension School's part-time and online programs, consider that an M.B.A. is really a different animal than a degree in history, art, computer science, or biology. MBA programs strive to teach teamwork and leadership, which require a lot of face-to-face time and cooperative effort. For instance, the Harvard Business School's degree programs are organized around groups who meet frequently to manage projects and solve problems together.

Additionally, many companies are looking for young business school graduates who can be shaped to a company culture and groomed for leadership positions over many years, whereas part-time or executive MBA programs are more likely to have older, mid-career students.

Still, there are some lessons to be learned in this article. One is that online degrees have an image problem. There are a lot of scams out there. Diploma mills are all over the 'Net, while other schools use unqualified or inexperienced faculty to teach online classes.

Speaking from my own point of view, I think a classroom environment is a far more efficient medium for academic discourse. On the other hand, something can be said for online's ability to archive coursework, and access coursework at convenient times from anyplace in the world. I think schools like Harvard have to be careful to maintain high admission and academic standards with its online programs, or encourage a hybrid approach (some online, with some in-classroom credit) while taking advantage of the benefits of online.

Additionally, The Wall Street Journal article mentioned that some schools treat their own full-time and part-time graduates differently. NYU's Stern school won't let graduates of the part-time M.B.A. program access the same career fairs and resources that full-time students can. The same is true for Harvard. Even though Extension School Students are part of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, we can't use the same career office as Harvard College or GSAS students -- they won't even answer your email! Additionally, while the Harvard Business School allows cross-registration from Harvard's other professional schools, and even Tufts students, Extension School degree candidates (and if you are a Harvard employee, TAP registrations) are not welcome.

This is discrimination. While Extension School students are more integrated with campus benefits and academic resources now than 10 years ago, Harvard really needs to pay attention to is fair treatment of Extension School students within the Harvard community, regardless of their background, age, or ability to attend classes full-time.

Sunday, October 02, 2005

Theis proposal: Start, write, throw away, rewrite

I have not posted in a while, owing to the fact that I have finally started my proposal. In the past two weeks or so it has come quite a long way, as I shall show later with a few examples.

One thing that I've learned over the years about writing academic essays, news articles, or even blog posts, is that you don't have to live with the first draft, and in fact, you should be prepared to toss it and start over from scratch if it doesn't feel right, or your examples are drifting into side topics that detract from your main argument.

This is what happened with my first draft (version 092605, see below.) After 1400 words (about six double-spaced pages) of mostly background and a little analysis, I realized that I had gotten way ahead of myself -- the Guide to the ALM Thesis (6th edition, info and download here) lays out a structure which specifically calls for writers to state their research questions and tentative hypothesis in the first page or two. So back to the drawing board I went. This draft wasn't a total loss, though. -- I probably will copy and paste sections for this draft into the "Background of the Problem" section of future drafts.

Writing multiple drafts also gives you a chance to really think through your ideas and reasoning. This is what I learned while crafting my second draft. My study is about China's attitudes toward Vietnam, using quantitative research methods to analyze the Xinhua news agency's output on the subject over a long period of time. But is the main problem the nature of the Xinhua news agency, and how it's currently used by academics, or is it the foreign policy issues that relate to Beijing's views of Vietnam? Looking at the second draft (092805b) you will get an idea of how I initially approached this. Then, looking at the third most recent draft (100305) you will see how I changed my mind.

OK, without further ado, the first three paragraphs of the first three drafts (please note that I leave notes to myself for future follow-up in brackets):

First draft (092605)
Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 China has undergone a remarkable political, social, and economic transformation. The changes have not only affected China and its people; they have also had a tremendous impact on neighboring countries. And while many countries share a land border with China, only one has been the subject of large-scale military actions by the People’s Liberation Army since 1976. That country is Vietnam.

China and Vietnam have a long history involving the exchange of cultural and social influences, immigration, trade, political relations, war, and rebellion over many centuries. The fact that both modern nations share ideological and political similarities (both governments are officially Communist, while embracing capitalist reforms) has done little to improve bilateral relations since the mid-1970s. Why is this? Specifically, from China’s point of view, what can explain Beijing’s attitudes and intentions toward Vietnam over the last three decades?

Students of history and government have spent a great deal of effort attempting to answer these questions. Historians have looked at historical animosity between the two countries, as well as Vietnamese resentment over China’s longstanding dominance and influence over Indochina. As for the flare-up in bilaterial relations in the late 1970s, experts point to China’s concern over Vietnam’s treatement of ethnic Chinese living in that country. The pitched sea battle in 1988 was rooted in long-standing territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Academics with specialties in international relations theory often point to Cold War geopolitical issues— China’s and Vietnam’s relations with the U.S. and the Soviet Unions (and later, Russia), and Beijing’s concerns about superpower intentions in the region.

Often, research as been qualitative in nature, and based on the examination of the following factors [long list follows] ...

Second draft (092805b)
Since the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, reforms have transformed China’s media from drab propaganda to vibrant commercial-oriented press. However, certain aspects of China’s media environment have not changed. State-run and privately owned press organizations cannot directly attack the state, the party, or central leadership, and are supposed to follow the official line on sensitive issues such as Taiwan independence and the status of outlawed groups such as Falun Gong. Additionally, all news reports concerning China’s foreign affairs must be taken directly from a single source: The state-run New China News Agency (NCNA).

Simultaneously, China’s foreign affairs have also undergone a transformation. A policy that in the mid-1970s supported revolutionary movements around the globe and tried to carve an independent way between the United States and Soviet Union has become … [econ, trade, security]. China’s relations with countries that share a land border have shifted as well, although in the case of one country, Vietnam, relations have remained poor through much of the period.

My study proposes to use a quantitative methodology to analyze NCNA reports in oder to better understand Sino-Vietnamese relations under the leadership of DXP, who effectively controlled the Chinese government from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. I will investigate the following questions:

Which of the following issues were most important determinants of Sino-Viet relations?

A) Geopolitical factors -- China’s relations with the United States and Soviet Union, and the two superpowers’ efforts to win over Vietnam.
B) A prominent regional factor – the Kampuchean conflict
C) Bilateral disputes: Vietnam’s treatment of overseas Chinese, and conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea

My hypothesis ....

Most recent draft (100305)
Between the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976 and the early 1990s [retirement of Deng, or breakup of Soviet Union?], China’s relations with Vietnam were poor. On several occasions during this period — in 1979 along their land border, and in 1988 in the Paracel Islands — the People’s Liberation Army launched military offensives against Vietnam that altogether resulted in thousands of deaths on both sides.

The foreign policy issues most often cited for China’s hostility toward Vietnam include five geopolitical, regional, and bilateral issues. In the ebb and flow of superpower alliances and global power shifts, Beijing was extremely alarmed by Hanoi’s cozy relationship with Moscow. The Soviet Union provided extensive economic and military aid to Vietnam, which gave the Soviet military access to bases in Vietnam and a secure warm-water port a few hundred miles off the coast of South China. China was also suspicious of Vietnam’s regional ambitions in Kampuchea, where China’s Khmer Rouge allies regularly attacked — and were attacked by — Vietnamese forces. Two bilateral issues which concerned China enough to result in the military offensives cited above were Vietnam’s treatment of ethnic Chinese and conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Even when China’s military was not deployed, Beijing’s propaganda arm kept up the public pressure on Vietnam [rephrase] throughout this period. This was especially true of the English wire service reports of the New China News Agency (NCNA), which is charged with, among other things, broadcasting Beijing’s official view on foreign affairs issues. While a propaganda outlet such as NCNA’s English service could be trusted to disseminate accurate or unbiased facts of news events relating to the issues cited above, it was certainly a barometer of the attitudes of the Chinese leadership and for this reason was (and still is) monitored by diplomats, journalists, and academics all over the world for insight into Sino-Viet relations. ...

I believe this last version is the best way to proceed. Notice how I framed the starting time point (the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976) in the same way in all three versions, but only in the last did I name an end point (the early 1990s). Earlier, I was considering the mid 1990s, to make it a nice round number (20 years) and also include developments following thawing of U.S.-Vietnamese relations during the Clinton administration. However, I realized that I will make my job a lot easier if I exclude the U.S. factor as a primary variable, and instead concentrate on Sino-Viet relations vis-a-vis the USSR, Kampuchea, and the two bilateral issues named in the most recent draft.

Anyway, it's almost midnight, and I need to go to bed. But stay tuned for progress reports ...